This paper studies an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, but whether there are positive production externalities between agents: the output of any agent depends positively on the e¤ort expended by other agents.
Introduction
There is now a considerable literature on the principal-agent problem with multiple agents, both with hidden action and hidden information. Multiple-agent problems only di¤er from single-agent problems if there is some interaction between the agents. The two main forms of interaction that are of interest are …rst, production externalities between agents (the output of a particular agent depends on the e¤ort of other agents), and second, statistical correlation in the environments of the agents.
Most of the literature so far has focussed on the second kind of interaction. For example, in the hidden information case, a literature, starting with Demski and Sappington[4] , has focussed on the implications of (positive) correlation of the cost of e¤ort of two agents. It turns out that, even in the case where agents are identical ex ante, before their private information is revealed, the optimal contract for the principal treats the agents asymmetrically, recruiting one of the agents as a "policeman", who can report on the type of the other agent (Demski and Sappington[4] , Glover[6] , Ma, Moore and Turnbull[13] ). Again, in principal-agent problems with hidden actions, attention has focused on the case where the production functions that map e¤orts of the agents into outputs are subject to correlated random disturbances. In this setting, comparative compensation contracts, such as contests, may be optimal (Mookherjee[16] , Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz[17] ).
By contrast, the implications of production externalities for the contract design have little studied 1 in the hidden action case, and not at all (to my knowledge) in the hidden information case. This paper presents an analysis of a principal-multi-agent model with hidden information where there are (positive) production externalities between agents. The main …nding is that, in the optimal contract for the principal, the distortions that arise relative to the …rst-best are quite novel: they cannot arise in principal-multi-agent models without production externalities, even with correlated costs, unless the reservation utilities of the agents vary with their cost-type in such a way that agents face countervailing incen-1 Exceptions are Che and Yoo[2] , Itoh [9] , Kandal and Lazear [10] , and Mookherjee[16] , all of whom consider hidden action models. However, none of these papers is very close to this one, for reasons explained in detail in the conclusions. tives in revealing cost information to the principal 2 . Here, we abstract from countervailing incentives (by assuming that all agents have a reservation utility of zero) and show that nevertheless, there is two-way distortion in output: an agent will choose an ine¢ciently low value of output for some values of his private information, and an ine¢ciently high value for other values.
The basic principal-agent model studied here is one where a number of agents choose e¤ort to produce outputs: the output of agent i depends not only on his own e¤ort, but also positively on the average e¤ort made by all other agents (the externalities are those studied by Cooper and John[5] under the heading of "input games"). The basic model is extended in Section 5 to allow for a richer structure of production externalities.
The marginal cost of e¤ort to agent i is parameterized by a variable µ i , which is i 0 s private information, and the µ i are independently distributed 3 . There are no countervailing incentives; reservation utility is zero for all agents. A contract o¤ered by the principal to each agent is a choice of output and a monetary transfer, conditional on the vector of reported µs from all agents.
We study incentive-compatible contracts for the principal in this setting, i.e. contracts
where it is either a dominant or Nash equilibrium strategy for each agent to tell the truth.
We assume that the number of agents is "large"; under this condition, we show that the principal is no worse o¤ o¤ering a dominant-strategy incentive-compatible contract than a Nash incentive-compatible one (see Proposition 1), and so we can without loss of generality consider just the former class of contracts 4 . We show that, under quite weak conditions 5   ,   2 See Lewis and Sappington[12] , . We discuss this literature in more detail in Section 7.
3
In fact, we assume a measure space of agents, where the distribution of marginal costs across agents is common knowledge. However, this can be interpreted as the limiting case of a model with a …nite number of agents, where the marginal costs of agents are independently and identically distributed. This is in contrast to the literature on two-agent models with private (correlated) information, where the dominant-strategy incentive constraints are more restictive than the Bayes-Nash incentive constraints.
5
See Theorem 1 below for a full statement of su¢cient conditions; these comprise standard conditions on cost and revenue functions, plus some weak conditions on the spillovers between agents, and …nally the requirement that the cost function must be separable in the agent's e¤ort and cost parameter, and convex in the latter.
for the principal's optimal contract in this class, the output of agent i is oversupplied for low values of µ i , and undersupplied for high values of µ i .
The intuition is simple. First, as in the standard principal-agent model, for any value of µ i , the informational rent captured by any agent i is increasing in the e¤ort put in by that agent. It follows from this that informational rent captured by any agent i is decreasing in average output of agents j 6 = i, as an increase in the average output of agents j 6 = i decreases the amount of e¤ort agent i needs to put in to produce a given output. So, there is an interaction between the production externality and informational rent. This interaction means that the principal has an additional incentive (over and above the production externality) to raise the output of any agent i. This incentive co-exists with the standard incentive -absent the externality -for the principal to restrict agent i 0 s output in order to reduce agent i 0 s own informational rent, and so two-way distortion is the outcome.
So, one way of expressing this intuition is to observe that in the setting of this paper, the principal, rather than the agents, faces countervailing incentives; that is, he faces incentives both to lower and raise the output of any particular agent relative to the …rst-best. This intuition also relates to the general point, made e.g. by Sappington[18] , that a principal may introduce distortions in other instruments to better limit agents' rents. In this case, the extra instrument that the principal has, when facing any particular agent, is the (average) output of other agents. Seen in this way, the main contribution of this paper is to establish the precise pattern of the distortion in the other instrument.
A second notable feature 6 of the optimal contract is that the transfer from principal to agent has a yardstick property i.e. the transfer to some agent i is (at some point) decreasing in the output of the other agent(s). This is the case even though the types of the agents are uncorrelated, so the principa1 cannot exploit the correlation between agents' 6 It is of course, well-known that in principal-multi-agent schemes with statistical correlation of costs across agents, comparative compensation of the agents is often optimal. As shown by Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz[17] , and Mookherjee[16] , contests (where agents are compensated only on the basis of the ordinal ranking of their outputs) are sometimes optimal, and contests certainly have the yardstick property. Moreover, necessary and su¢cient conditions for contracts to be independent are very strong (Mookherjee[16] ).
types to extract additional informational rents, as in Cremer and McLean[3] , Demski and Sappington[4] .
The arrangement of the rest of the paper is as follows. The model is presented in Section 2, and dominant-strategy incentive-compatible contracts are characterized in Section 3. The main results on two-way distortion are presented in Section 4. Section 5 extends these results to a richer class of production externalities. Section 6 discusses the yardstick property of the optimal contract, and Section 7 discusses the related literature, especially the work on countervailing incentives an principal-multi-agent problems, and concludes.
The Model
The model is an otherwise standard principal-multi-agent model with production externalities between agents. It is analytically convenient (for reasons explained in the next section) to work with a "large" number of agents. Let the space of agents be (I; S; ¹),
where I = [0; 1]; S is the Borel ¾-algebra on I, and ¹ is the Lebesque measure. Every agent provides e¤ort level e i 2 < + at cost
where µ i 2 [µ; µ] = £ parameterizes i 0 s cost of e¤ort. We assume the following properties of c(:; :);
A1
. c e ; c µ ; c µe ; > 0, c ee ; c µee ; c µµe¸0 :
These inequalities include the standard assumptions of positive and increasing marginal cost of e¤ort, and the single-crossing condition c µe . A special case that satis…es A1 is c(e; µ) = µe: The parameter µ i is private information of agent i.
The agent also receives a transfer t i 2 < of a numeraire good from the principal, so his utility from the pair (e i ; t i ) is
Every agent has a reservation utility of zero, so there are no countervailing incentives for agents.
Spillovers are speci…ed as follows. We suppose that the agents are all engaged in production processes, where the marginal product of any agent's e¤ort is a¤ected by the average e¤ort of the others, e = R I e i d¹. In other words, the set of agents I is a team, and the team production technology is such that the spillover for agent i from the e¤ort of agent j 6 = i is the same as from the e¤ort of any other agent k 6 = i. This is a natural simplifying assumption often made when studying games with production externalities and large numbers of players (e.g. Cooper and John's [5] "input games"). It is relaxed in Section 5.
Following Cooper and John[5] , we suppose the externality takes the following form:
where q i is output of i: We assume that g is twice continuously di¤erentiable, and that it satis…es:
A2. g(e); g 0 (e) > 0; e 2 < + :
These assumptions are reasonable: g 0 > 0 says that the spillover is positive, and g > 0 requires in particular that any agent i can produce even if all others do not i.e. g(0) > 0.
We choose units so that g(0) = 1: An example satisfying A2 is g = 1 + e
The production function (2) implies that the cost to agent i in e¤ort units of producing q i also depends on aggregate output q: First, integrating over all the agents, (2) implies
where q = R I q i d¹. Then, as g 0 (e) > 0, e 2 < + ; the relationship (3) can be inverted on < + to give e =°(q): But then from (2), we can write
So, q i s(q) is the amount of e¤ort required for agent i to produce output q i : Note that s 0 (q) = ¡s 2 g 0°0 < 0 as both g 0 ;°0 > 0. That is, the higher aggregate output, the lower the e¤ort required for i to produce some …xed output q i . Note also that as we have assumed
The output of agent i generates revenue for the principal of r(q i ), where r(:) is strictly increasing and strictly concave: The idea here is that agent's outputs are di¤erentiated and sold in separate markets 7 . The principal keeps the aggregate revenue net of payments, and so gets pro…t : As all agents are ex ante identical, we can focus on anonymous contracts where (t i ; q i ) depends only onμ i and the distribution of announced characteristics. These contracts are de…ned formally in the next section.
The order of events is now as follows. First, the principal chooses an anonymous contract.
Then, every agent i 2 I simultaneously announces a typeμ i 2 £. Finally, production takes place and transfers are made.
Incentive-Compatible Contracts
We begin by de…ning anonymous contracts. We assume that µ i :I ! £ is a measurable function. Consequently, we can de…ne the measure º on £ by º(A)=¹(fi 2 I jµ i 2 Ag), for all A in the Borel ¾-algebra on £; so; º is the distribution of (true) costs on £: Also, let An alternative assumption would be that the agents' outputs are identical, and so sold in the same market, in which case revenue would be r = r( R I q i d¹): In this case, the analysis is exactly the same, except we must strengthen A1 slightly by imposing c ee > 0 to ensure an unique solution to problem P below.
8 It would of course be possible in principle to have contract where the principal chooses a compensationinput pair (t i ; e i ). However, following much of the principal-agent literature, we suppose that e¤ort is non-contractible (Hart[7] ).
9
For this to be the case, we require the sets fi 2 I jµ i 2 Ag ; n i 2 I¯μ i 2 A o to be measurable with respect to ¹ for all Borel sets A ½ £: The …rst sets are all measurable as the map f(i) = µ i is assumed measurable with respect to ¹. The second sets are all measurable if, in turn, the "announcement function"
h (i.e. h(i)´μ i ) mapping I into £ is assumed measurable with respect to ¹. In the announcement game, agents are restricted to play anonymous strategies i.e. agent i announcesμ i = ¾(µ i ), where ¾ : £ ! £ is measurable with respect to º:(see below): So, the "announcement function" is the composition h = ¾ ± f;
where f(i) = µ i : As, both ¾; f are measurable by assumption, so is h (Hildenbrand [8], p42).
º;ô 2 P (£); where P (£) is the set of (Borel) probability measures on £: We now have: De…nition 1. An anonymous contract is a pair of functions t : £ £ P (£) ! <; q :
£ £ P (£) ! < + where agent i is o¤ered (t i ; q i ) = (t(μ i ;ô); q(μ i ;ô)) i¤ he announces a typê µ i and distribution of announced costs isô.
So, with an anonymous contract, (t i ; q i ) depends only on i 0 s announced cost and the distribution of announced costsô: Consequently, the payo¤ to any agent i 2 I with µ i = µ who makes a cost announcementμ depends only on µ;μ;ô;
Note thatq is the average output across all agents, given a distributionô of announced characteristics.
So, given a …xed anonymous contract, the agents play an "announcement" game. As any agent's utility depends only on his own action µ and the aggregate distribution of we assume that a strategy pro…le in the announcement game is a measurable function
We can now de…ne dominant-strategy and Nash incentive-compatible contracts.
De…nition 2. An anonymous contract is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible i¤ u(µ; µ;ô)¸u(µ;μ;ô), all µ;μ 2 £, allμ 6 = µ; allô 2 P (£)
That is, truth-telling (¾(µ) = µ) is a dominant-strategy for any agent in the announcement game. Nash incentive-compatible contracts are de…ned similarly;.
De…nition 3. An anonymous contract is Nash incentive-compatible i¤ u(µ; µ; º)¸u(µ;μ; º), all µ;μ 2 £, allμ 6 = µ
That is, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium in the announcement game; it is best for any agent to tell the truth, given the distribution of announced costs is the true one.
Our …rst result gives conditions under which a contract is dominant-strategy or Nash incentive-compatible. This, and all subsequent results, are proved in the Appendix.
for all (μ;ô) 2 £ £ P (£), whereq is de…ned as above, and
Moreover, there is a dominant-strategy incentive-compatible contract that yields the principal the same payo¤ as her highest payo¤ from the Nash incentive-compatible contract.
Proposition 1 indicates that the principal can restrict attention to dominant-strategy incentive-compatible contracts. So, we drop the "D" subscript on q D ; t D without loss of generality. The dependence of this pair on the measure of announced characteristics,ô, is suppressed below for brevity except where appropriate, so we may write an anonymous contract simply as (t(µ); q(µ)) µ2£ .
It is also a result of independent interest for the following reason. It is well-known that when the number of agents is …nite (e.g. with two agents) in problems of this types, the principal can generally do better with Nash incentive-compatible contracts than with dominantstrategy contracts, under the assumption that the truth-telling equilibrium prevails, as the constraints placed on contract design are less demanding (Demski and Sappington [4] ).
The key assumption that generates this equivalence for the principal is that the number of agents is "large", not any of the other assumptions of the model. For then, from the point of view of any particular agent i 2 I, the behavior of other players in the "announcement" game is non-stochastic in the aggregate i.e. every player faces a …xed distribution of announcementsv. To see this, suppose that we have a general production technology where the spillover s depends on the entire distribution of output, Â, not just the average q.
Then, inspection of the proof of Proposition 1 reveals that the result goes though as before, where s(Â) replaces s (q).
Contract Design and Two-Way Distortion
The problem faced by the principal is to choose a (dominant-strategy) incentive-compatible contract to maximise his pro…t, de…ned in (5), from among the class of such contracts. The problem can be formulated as follows. First, let F : £ ! [0; 1] be the distribution function of costs de…ned as F (x) = º([µ; x]), and suppose that F (:) is absolutely continuous, with density f (:) > 0: Also, let w(µ)´u(µ; µ; º): Then the principal's payo¤ is;
In the second line we have used (9), and the fact that A D = w( ¹ µ), as shown in the Appendix, where w(µ)´u(µ; µ; º). In the third line, we have integrated by parts, and …nally
where
for the distribution of µ: So, Ã(e; µ) has an obvious interpretation as the perceived cost, from the principal's point of view, of extracting output q(µ) from a type-µ when aggregate output is q. The second term in (12) is the informational rent accruing to the agent and is positive by A1, so the perceived cost always strictly exceeds the true cost (Ã(e; µ)¸c(e; µ)), and does so strictly unless µ = µ.
The principal therefore solves 11 the following problem:
10 h(x) can be interpreted as the approximate conditional probability (for small ¢) that cost parameter µ does not fall below x ¡ ¢ given that it has already fallen from ¹ µ to x (La¤ont and Tirole[11], p66).
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. Note that the choice of q; t must also ensure that the agent participation constraints w(µ)¸0 are satis…ed. First, as w 0 < 0 by standard arguments, the only potentially binding participation constraint is w(µ)¸0. As µ is decreasing in w(µ); it is immediately obvious that the principal sets w(µ) = 0:
Call this problem P. Even in the absence of the monotonicity constraint q 0 (µ) · 0, this is not a concave problem, due to the presence of externalities in the perceived cost function.
Denote by (q ¤ (µ)) µ2£ a solution to P. We will say that a solution to P is
We can characterize the solution to P under the following assumption which ensures an interior solution;
A3. r 0 (0) > Ã e (0; µ); lim q!1 r 0 (q) = 0; lim e!1 c e (e; µ) = 1:
Assumption A3 imposes quite standard Inada-type conditions on revenue and cost functions.
Proposition 2. If A1-A3 hold, and the monotone hazard rate condition h 0 (µ) · µ; µ 2 £ holds, then there exists an interior solution to problem P, and at this solution, q(µ) solves
where the expectation is taken with respect to µ:
Note that (13) equates the marginal revenue generated by an increase in q(µ) to the perceived marginal cost to the principal -taking into account informational rent and the production externality -of an increase in q(µ). The …rst term on the right-hand side of (13) is the internal marginal cost of raising q(µ) incrementally, and the second term (which is negative, as s 0 < 0) is the external marginal bene…t of raising q(µ) in terms of reduced costs for all agents.
We can now turn to analyze the distortions induced by the presence of both informational rent and externalities at the solution to problem P, and which are implicit in the …rst-order condition (13). The benchmark is the full-information case, where the principal can observe the cost parameter of each agent. In this case, the principal sets marginal bene…t of an increment in q(µ) equal to true marginal cost, ignoring informational rent i.e. we replace the perceived marginal cost function in (13) by the true one to get
Again, the …rst term on the right-hand side of (14) is the internal marginal cost of raising q(µ) incrementally, and the second is the external marginal bene…t of raising q(µ).
Compare (13) to (14) …rst for the familiar case without externalities. In this case, we can take s(q)´1; s 0 (q)´0. Then, the full-information and incentive-compatible …rst-order conditions are
respectively. So, inspection of (15), (16), plus the fact that c µe > 0 from A1, indicates that without externalities, when µ is private information, marginal cost is "too high", due to the presence of informational rents, and e¤ort is undersupplied for all values of µ except the lowest: This is a standard result (La¤ont and Tirole [11] ).
In the general case, by reference to (14), we have the following de…nition.
De…nition 4. Output is oversupplied by an agent of type µ if
and undersupplied by an agent of type µ if
So, with oversupply, marginal revenue of an increment in output is below the marginal cost of an increment in output (taking into account spillover e¤ects), and conversely, with undersupply, it is above. We now have the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1. Assume A1-A3 hold, the monotone hazard rate condition holds, and that c(µ; e) = ·(µ)c(e); with · 00¸0 : Then, there is two-way distortion in the solution to problem P. That is, there exists µ < µ 0 < ¹ µ such that for µ 2 [µ; µ 0 ), e¤ort is oversupplied, and for
This result can be interpreted as follows. At the solution to P, the principal always equates marginal revenue to perceived marginal cost Ã e s(q) + E[Ã e q(µ)]s 0 (q): So, Theorem 1 says that when µ is high, perceived marginal cost is greater than true marginal cost, and when µ is low, perceived marginal cost is less than true marginal cost. This is to be compared to the standard case without externalities, where perceived marginal cost is greater than true marginal cost for all µ. So, the new insight here is that with production externalities, when µ is low, perceived marginal cost is less than true marginal cost, even though perceived total cost is always greater then true total cost; it is this that generates the two-way distortion.
The intuition for this new result is as follows. From (13), (14), the di¤erence between the perceived and true marginal cost of output is
The …rst term in (17) is due to informational rent, and is always positive. The second term is negative as s 0 < 0. It captures the e¤ect that an increase in q(µ) has on the information rent accruing to other agents via the spillover. Speci…cally, a small increase ¢ in q(µ)
leads to a reduction ¢s 0 (q) in the e¤ort required by all agents, and this in turn leads to a reduction of
in the informational rent captured by these agents. Whether the perceived marginal cost of output is above or below the true marginal cost depends on the relative magnitude of these two terms. When µ ' µ, 1=h(µ) ' 0, and so the second term in (17) dominates the …rst term, implying that the perceived marginal cost of output is below the true marginal cost, and leading in turn to oversupply by our de…nition.
We now comment on the su¢cient conditions for two-way distortion. First, assumptions A1-A3 are not at all restrictive. Assumption A1 is quite standard in the principal-agent literature. Assumption A2 imposes weak and reasonable conditions on the spillover function g, and A3 imposes quite standard Inada-type conditions on r and c. Finally, the condition that c be separable in e; µ and convex in µ is quite weak.
Multiple Teams
Probably the main restriction of the model of this paper is that only the aggregate e¤ort of agents a¤ects the marginal cost of e¤ort of any particular agent. One simple way of relaxing this assumption somewhat is to suppose that there are two groups of agents, or teams, I l ; l = a; b, with I a [ I b = I; I a \ I b = ;: Then, it is natural to suppose that the aggregate e¤ort of team a; e a , has some impact on the productivity of a member of team b, but less than the e¤ect it has on the productivity of a member of team a. This can be captured formally by writing
where superscripts denote team membership, and 0 < ¾ < 1 measures the between-team spillover, which is less than the within-team spillover as ¾ < 1. Also, we assume that g(:) satis…es A2. Using the identity e l = R i2I l e l i d¹; we have
Now, it is easily checked that the Jacobian of the system (18), (19) By the symmetry of technology,°a(x; y)´°b(y; x). Let°a j (q a ; q b ) denote the derivative of°a with respect to its jth argument; j = a; b; and the same for°b. For future reference,
where g i = g(e i + ¾e j ); and
So, from (20), an increase in output by team a requires an increase in e¤ort by team a, but an increase in output by team b allows members of team a to reduce their e¤ort, while producing a constant output, due to the inter-team spillover. Now, for a member i of team a, we can de…ne
and s b (q a ; q b ) can be de…ned similarly. By the symmetry of technology, s a (x; y)´s b (y; x). for j = a; b.
The preferences of both principal and agents are as before; any agent i 2 I l has a cost of e¤ort function c(µ i ; e i ) which satis…es A1 and A3, and the agents maximise their transfer from the principal net of the cost of e¤ort. As before, the output of any agent i 2 I l generates revenue r(q i ) for the principal, where r satis…es A3, and the principal wishes to maximize the sum across teams of revenue minus transfers.
In the multi-team case, an anonymous contract for team l is de…ned as above i.e. as a pair of functions t l : £ £ P (£) £ P (£) ! <; q l : £ £ P (£) £ P (£) ! < + where agent i 2 I l is o¤ered (t i ; q i ) = (t l (μ i ;ô); q l (μ i ;ô)) i¤ he announces a typeμ i and the distribution of announced costs for both teams isô = (ô a ;ô b ):
Then it is easy to check that Proposition 1 goes though, modi…ed in the obvious way i.e. the principal can do no better with a Nash incentive-compatible contract than with a dominant-strategy one, and the transfer to a member of team l = a; b who reportsμ is 
Due to the symmetry of the problem, we focus on the class of symmetric solutions to P 0 where q a (:) = q b (:) = q(:). Under assumption A3, there will be an interior symmetric solution to this problem i.e. Proposition 2 extends, and the …rst-order condition characterizing 12 See (A.23) in the Appendix.
Also, note that De…nitions 3 and 4 of undersupply and oversupply carry over directly to this case. We then have the following extension of the main result to the multi-team case;
Theorem 2. Assume that the assumptions of Theorem 1 on r; c, and F hold. Then, there is two-way distortion in the solution to problem P 0 . That is, there exists µ < µ 0 < ¹ µ such that if µ 2 [µ; µ 0 ), e¤ort is oversupplied, and for µ 2 (µ 0 ; µ], e¤ort is undersupplied.
It seems likely that a version of this result could be proved for the case of n teams, although the statement and proof would be cumbersome. So, our two-way distortion result does not depend crucially on the precise form of the externality between agents.
Yardstick Transfers
So far, we have restricted attention to contracts where agents directly report their types (direct mechanisms, in the parlance of the implementation literature). In practice, principals generally use contracts where the transfer from principal to agent(s) depends on output, rather than a reported type (indirect mechanisms). However, the class of incentivecompatible contracts described in Proposition 1 can easily be written in this form.
Letq

¡1
be the inverse of q i =q(µ i ); this inverse always exists as the monotonicity condition is satis…ed by assumption of a monotone hazard rate (Proposition 2). Now consider the transfer schedule
Note also that the transfer schedule (24) satis…es the yardstick property, as de…ned in the introduction; namely, that the transfer to some agent i is decreasing in the output of other agent(s). To see this, di¤erentiate to get
Conclusions and Related Literature
This paper has shown that in an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, the presence of positive production externalities between agents leads, under quite general conditions, to two-way distortion, with the output of any agent i being oversupplied when his marginal cost of e¤ort is low, and undersupplied when his marginal cost of e¤ort is high. As remarked in the Introduction, two-way distortion cannot arise in principal-multi-agent models with hidden information of the type studied in the literature 13 , and a fortiori, it cannot arise in the standard single-agent case.
The literature related to the analysis of this paper is small. There is to my knowledge, no work that studies production externalities in principal-multi-agent models with hidden
information. There are a small number of papers which allow for production externalities in tirely with the study of the cost-minimization problem for the principal (characterizing the minimum cost of inducing a given pair of actions by the two agents), and do not discuss the issue of whether actions that are then chosen by the principal are above or below their …rst-best levels.
Itoh [9] studies choice of e¤ort level as well as the cost-minimization problem given e¤ort levels, but his focus is rather di¤erent. Speci…cally, each of two agents can choose not only an e¤ort level that enhances the success probability of his own project, but also the level of another e¤ort variable ("helping" e¤ort) that enhances the success probability of the other agent's project. The main objective of his paper is to establish conditions under which the principal will choose a positive level of "helping" e¤ort in the incentive-compatible contract.
By contrast, in the model of this paper, e¤ort is one-dimensional, but has a joint product; it enhances the output not only of the agent who exerts it, but other agents.
Finally, Kandal and Lazear[10] allow for general production spillovers, but they do not characterize the principal's optimal incentive-compatible contract. Rather they study a
13
As shown by Demski and Sappington[4] , and Ma, Moore, and Turnbull [13] , output is always undersupplied, whether the announcement game equilibrium is in dominant or Bayes-Nash strategies.
particular "equal shares" contract where each of N agents gets 1/N of the revenue (or output), and study Nash equilibria in e¤ort levels in this setting. Their focus is on the role of "peer pressure" i.e. social norms or informal monitoring and punishment within the group of agents in enhancing Nash equilibrium e¤ort levels.
However, as mentioned in the introduction, it is well-known that two-way distortion can arise in the single-agent case when the standard set-up is modi…ed so that the agent faces countervailing incentives (Lewis and Sappington[12] , ).
This case arises when the reservation utility of the agent, as well as his cost of acting for the principal, depends on his private information. It was …rst observed by Lewis and Sappington[12] that two-way distortion could arise in this case. For example, consider the problem of regulation of a monopolist with unknown cost (Baron and Myerson, [1] ) where the regulator chooses the output of the …rm ,and a transfer payment to the …rm i.e. a non-linear price. Such a model can be interpreted as a special case (i.e. without spillovers)
of the one considered in this paper. Suppose, plausibly, that the …rm's reservation pro…t (the pro…t it could make by exiting the regulated market and producing elsewhere) depends negatively upon its marginal cost parameter 14 , µ. In this case, the …rm has an incentive to understate its marginal cost (to increase its reported reservation pro…t, in order to induce the regulator to set a higher price), as well as to overstate its marginal cost (again, to induce the regulator to set a higher price).
A complete analysis of a principal-agent problem with countervailing incentives is presented in , where it is shown that the pattern of the two-way distortion (and whether or not there is pooling) depends crucially on whether the reservation utility of the agent is convex or concave in his private information. If it is a concave or mildly convex function, then the agent's output is ine¢ciently low when his cost of production is low, and ine¢ciently high when his cost of production is high. If the reservation utility is strongly convex, then the opposite is the case 15 .
14 As in the model of this paper without spillovers, we assume that the cost of the …rm is c(q; µ) where q is output and the analogue of A1 above is satis…ed.
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Also, in the concave/mildly convex case, production is e¢cient at the highest and lowest costs, and also at an interior cost. In the strongly convex case, production is e¢cient only at an interior cost value.
One intuition for their result, in the context of the Baron-Myerson model, is as follows.
Suppose that µ can only take on two values, "high" or "low". If the …rm has, on balance, an incentive to overstate its cost, the optimal action for the principal is to allow the low-cost …rm to produce at a point where marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost. This is because high-cost …rms will wish to imitate low cost …rms at the full-information optimum, and these constraints can be slackened by reducing output and price of low-cost …rms, thus making their price-output pair less attractive to high-cost …rms. An identical logic applies in the other case: if the …rm has, on balance, an incentive to understate his cost, the optimal action for the principal is to allow the high-cost …rm to produce at a point where marginal revenue is less than marginal cost.
Now return to the case where µ is a continuous variable. The derivative of reservation pro…t with respect to µ measures the strength of the incentive that the …rm has to understate its marginal cost slightly in order to increase its reported reservation pro…t. If the derivative of reservation pro…t with respect to µ is decreasing in µ (i.e. the reservation pro…t is concave in µ), then the marginal incentive to understate µ in order to increase its reservation pro…t is stronger when µ is high, and so high (low) µ types have on balance an incentive to understate (overstate). But then by the argument in the previous paragraph, the …rm's output is ine¢ciently low when its cost of production is low, and ine¢ciently high when its cost of production is high. The argument is similar in the case where the reservation pro…t is convex in µ:
The above discussion makes it clear that the intuition for two-way distortion in the countervailing incentives case is somewhat involved. By contrast, in our setting, there is a clear and simple intuition for the two-way distortion, as explained in Section 4 above.
Moreover, the pattern of two-way distortion identi…ed here is robust: it does not depend on the precise nature of the production externality, as long as it is positive and satis…es the very weak assumptions in A2 above. Finally, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare[15]assume a much more special class of cost functions than those considered in this paper 16 .
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In the notation of this paper, they assume c(q; µ) = µq:
A. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) First, as every agent is of measure zero, each agent takesô as …xed when deciding on her announcementμ. So, from De…nition 2, for truth-telling to be a dominant strategy,μ = µ must maximize (6) (ii) From De…nition 3, for truth-telling to be a Nash strategy, all we need is thatμ = µ must maximize (6), holdingô …xed at º: But then a similar argument implies that the contract will be Nash incentive-compatible as long as
q(µ; º)dº is aggregate output given truth-telling. We know by de…nition that given a Nash-incentive compatible contract (q N ; t N ), there-is a truth-telling equilibrium in the announcement game. At this equilibrium,ô = º: So, if we choose
, all µ 2 £, so there is a dominantstrategy incentive-compatible contract that yields the principal the same payo¤ as a Nash incentive-compatible contract when, in the induced announcement game, agents tell the truth.
(iii) Now consider the Nash incentive-compatible contract (q N (μ; º);t N (μ; º)) that maximizes the principal's expected payo¤, under the assumption that agents tell the truth 17 .
Given this contract, there may be other Nash equilibria in the announcement game, where a positive measure of agents do not tell the truth. It is clear that in any other such equilibrium, the principal can be no better o¤ than in the truth-telling equilibrium. Thus, the maximum payo¤ that the principal can get from any Nash incentive-compatible contract is no higher than the payo¤ that the principal can achieve from a dominant-strategy incentive-compatible contract. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. (i)
We proceed to solve problem P by initially ignoring the monotonicity constraint q 0 (µ) · 0: In general, the e¤ect on pro…t of a small increase in with respect to q(µ), taking into account the dependence of q on q(µ), is;
First, suppose that there is a non-interior solution where q(µ) = 0, for some µ 2 £. @¼ @q(µ) at this point, we get
Evaluating
where the last inequality follows by A3. So it pays the principal to increase q(µ); a contradiction.
Again, suppose that there is a no solution because
for someμ 2 £: Fix someq(:); and take a sequence fq n (µ)g 1 n=1 with q n (μ) =q(μ) + Á n with lim n!1 Á n = 1, and q n (µ 0 ) =q(µ 0 ); µ 0 6 =μ. Note that as q n (:) is equal toq(:) a.e., theñ
Taking the limit in (A.8), we get
where in the last line we have used lim q!1 r 0 (q) = 0; lim e!1 Ã e (e; µ) = 1 where the second limit follows directly from lim e!1 c e (e; µ) = 1 in A3 and Ã e¸ce . So, we conclude an interior solution always exists. This interior solution is characterized by …rst-order condition for a maximum of (11), which we obtain from (A.8) by equating the RHS to zero, dividing through by f (µ); and then writing out Ã e in full. This gives (13) in the text.
(ii) Let the solution to (13) be q(µ). For q(µ) to be feasible in P, it must be the case that it satis…es the monotonicity conditionq 0 (µ) · 0: Note that from (13), using the second-order condition, we have;
But again from (13), we have .12) so it su¢ces to show that Ã eµ > 0. Now, from (12), we have
Also, from A1, c eµµ¸0 , and from monotone hazard rate condition, h 
x 2 K is well-de…ned, as is the density g(
Recalling the de…nition of the hazard rate of G, it is su¢cient to prove that G(x)=g(x) is increasing in x: Then
The …rst term is non-negative as ·
00¸0
, and the second term is strictly positive by the fact that F has a decreasing hazard rate and d· ¡1 =dx > 0. So, we conclude that g(x)=G (x) is strictly decreasing on K, as required.
(ii) Note that 1=h(µ) = F (µ)=f (µ) = 0, and so from (13), we have at µ = µ that
As s 0 (q) < 0, and c µe > 0, it follows from (A.14) that
i.e. oversupply at µ = µ. Also, from (13), and De…nition 4, to have undersupply at µ = ¹ µ, we must have
Rearranging, and recalling s 0 (q) < 0, we get
Now note the following facts: (i) as the monotone hazard rate condition holds,
where we have used c µµe = 0 in the last line. So, from (i)-(iii), it follows that
So, from (A.16), a su¢cient condition for (A.15) to hold is that
But, the LHS of (A.18) is greater than 1 by the properties of c µe =h derived above. So, it is certainly su¢cient for undersupply at µ = ¹ µ that
, it follows that
But di¤erentiation of (3), which implicitly de…nes°; gives°0
So, combining(A.20) and (A.21), and using q = eg; we get
so (A.19) clearly holds, as required.
(iii) The …nal step is to show that there is a single critical value µ 0 below which there is oversupply, and above which there is undersupply, it su¢ces to show that the di¤erence between the perceived marginal cost (the right-hand side of (13)) and the true marginal cost (the right-hand side of (14)) is monotonically increasing in µ for a …xed q; q(µ): This di¤erence is given in (17), and is clearly increasing in µ for …xed q; q(µ) from the monotone hazard rate condition and the properties of c. ¤ Proof of Theorem 2. It is easy to check, using (23) and following the proof of Theorem 1, that there will be two-way distortion if
First, it follows directly from di¤erentiation of (22) that
Now, using (A.23), (20), (21), and the fact that q a = q b = q we get
where g = g(e + ¾e): So, we require that the term on the RHS of (A.24) be weakly less than 1, which simpli…es to could be generalised to q i = e i g(¾ i ). Also, suppose that g is linear, so q j = e j [® +¯¾ j ].
Then, multiplying through by d(i; j) and integrating this over j 2 I we get Returning to the Theorem, we note the following corollary:
Corollary 3. If the external e¤ect of aggregate e¤ort is iso-elastic i.e. g(e) = e ® , ® > 0, then there is always two-way distortion. in the Theorem is greater than unity, so in this case, the condition on the elasticity in the theorem always holds.
e wil also assume directly the following properties of s :
A2. s(0) < 1, lim q!1 qs 0 (q) = 0:
The …rst of these conditions says that any agent is able to produce even if all other agents do not, and the second ensures that in the aggregate, the size of the externality goes to zero as output goes to in…nity. An example which satis…es these conditions is the iso-elasric case g(e) = e ® : Then it is easily checked that s(q) = q [CUT Following Demski and Sappington[4] , we focus on two possible equilibrium concepts for this game, dominant strategy and Nash equilibrium.
This gives rise two concepts of an incentive-compatible contract.] La¤ont(1995) has shown that in an otherwise standard principal-agent model where the agent may take some unobservable e¤ort to reduce the probability of environmental catastrophe, and where the agent is risk-averse, and has limited liability, then Consequently, de…ne a transfer schedule as a map t : < 2 + ! < where is the transfer to agent i if he produces output i and aggregate output is q. Given a transfer schedule, the agents then play a game where the strategies are (q i ) i2I , and payo¤s u i = t(q i , q) ¡ q i s(q)µ i .
Call this the output game.
This game is non-trivial due to the spillovers, and the fact that t(q i , q) may depend non-trivially on q: This is simply the inventive-compatible payment schedule (9) written as a function of (q i ; q) rather than (µ i ; º). Asq 0 (µ i ) < 0, q i maximizes (24) if and only if µ i maximizes (9): So, we can conclude that faced with payo¤ u i = t(q i ; q) ¡ q i s(q)µ i where t(q i ; q) is de…ned in (24) q i =q(µ i ) maximizes u i whatever q i.e. q i =q(µ i ) is a dominant strategy for i in the output game
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. So, the output game replicates the outcome of the direct mechanism described above.
This is quite a striking result, because (as Cooper and John[5] have shown), output games of this type without principal-agent relationships (i.e. where agents capure the full value of their output) typically have multiple equilbria, due to strategic complementarities between agents.
